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Former National Basketball Association ("NBA") player Dennis
Rodman was a source of controversy throughout his career and re-
ceived significant attention from NBA commissioner David Stern. In
1997, Stern qualified his authority to punish Rodman and NBA play-
ers generally, stating "I want to make it clear that I'm not going to
punish [Rodman] for what he does off the court. I'm going to let the
media crucify him for that. . .This is still America, and my jurisdiction
is still the basketball court."'
Despite this statement, David Stern has enjoyed expansive discipli-
nary authority that extends beyond the basketball court, micromanag-
ing virtually all player conduct so long as it is related to a player's
employment with the NBA. During his tenure, Stern has installed
wide-ranging rules governing conduct by players, coaches, and team
officials, restricting what these individuals may say, wear, and do.
While Stern justifies these rules as vital to protect the integrity and
image of the league, many have criticized his decisions as paternalistic
intrusions into the lives of these professional athletes. Even further,
others have questioned whether he has exceeded his authority.
Stern's use of power is arguably unmatched by the commissioners of
any of the other three major sports leagues in the United States.2
Part II of this paper will analyze the authority of the NBA commis-
sioner, viewed in light of the powers of the commissioners in the three
other major sports leagues. It will also seek to define the contours of
* Michael R. Wilson is an Associate at the Chicago office of Wildman, Harrold, Allen &
Dixon LLP. He received his J.D. from the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champain College of
Law, Class of 2010, where he was Articles Editor for The Elder Law Journal, and a B.S. in
Public Administration from the University of Arizona, Eller College of Management, Class of
2007.
1. Karen Martin Dean, Can the NBA Punish Dennis Rodman? An Analysis of First Amend-
ment Rights in Professional Basketball, 23 VT. L. REV. 157, 175 (1998).
2. Along with the NBA, Major League Baseball ("MLB"), the National Football League
("NFL"), and the National Hockey League ("NHL") are considered the four major sports
leagues in the US.
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that authority. Part III of this paper will examine the rules that David
Stern has implemented in the past several years and determine
whether he has exceeded the scope of his authority. Part IV will rec-
ommend that the NBA players' union negotiate for further limits on
the commissioner's authority.
II. COMMISSIONER AUTHORITY
The MLB was the first league to establish the position of commis-
sioner, primarily in response to the "Black Sox" scandal that occurred
during the 1919 World Series.3 The club owners agreed that the posi-
tion was necessary to protect the integrity of the league, with a specific
focus on fighting gambling, and elected Judge Kenesaw Mountain
Landis as the first commissioner in 1921.4 The NFL and NBA in-
stalled their own commissioners shortly thereafter, and the NHL in-
stalled the position of commissioner in 1993.5
Each league grants similar authority to their respective commission-
ers through the league constitutions and by-laws. The league, through
negotiations with the respective players' unions, further defines the
limitations of that authority through Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments. External legal doctrines, such as the National Labor Relations
Act, private association law, and the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, may also serve to limit commissioner authority.
A. League Grants of Commissioner Authority
1. League Constitution and Bylaws
Historically, league commissioners have enjoyed expansive author-
ity to regulate their leagues. The constitutions and by-laws for each
league are the starting points in defining the authority of each league
3. Eight members of the Chicago White Sox were charged with conspiring to fix the outcome
of the 1919 World Series. White Sox Timeline, MLB.com, http://mlb.mlb.com/cws/history/time-
line01.jsp (last visited May 4, 2009).
4. Brent D. Showalter, Technical Foul: David Stern's Excessive Use of Rule-Making Authority,
18 MARO. SPoars L. REV. 205, 206-207 (2007).
5. In 1921, Joseph F. Carr became the first President of the American Professional Football
League. The title "president" was later changed to "commissioner" and the league was later
renamed the National Football League. Maurice Podoloff became the NBA's first commissioner
in 1949. Matthew B. Pachman, Note, Limits on the Discretionary Powers of Professional Sports
Commissioners: A Historical and Legal Analysis of Issues Raised by the Pete Rose Controversy,
76 VA. L. REv. 1409, 1439 n.55 (1990). The NHL was traditionally run by a "president," but that
position was eliminated in 1993 when Gary Bettman became the NHL's first commissioner. The
NHL commissioner's powers exceeded those formerly accorded to the NHL president. Thomas
J. Arkell, National Hockey League Jurisprudence: Past, Present and Future, 8 SETON HALi J.
SPoRTs L. 135, 136 (1998).
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commissioner. While the terminology varies slightly,6 "the four tradi-
tional professional sports leagues in the United States vest their com-
missioners with what is known as 'best interests of the sport'
authority."7 This authority gives the position of commissioner broad
discretion to protect the integrity and best interests of their sports
league.8 Each commissioner has the power "to discipline professional
athletes for a wide variety of activities, both on and off the field of
play."9 Under the grant of authority by the league constitutions and
bylaws, the commissioner can regulate any conduct he believes "to be
detrimental to the image and integrity of the league."' 0
The powers of the NBA commissioner, as enumerated by the NBA
Constitution, specifically permit the commissioner to discipline play-
ers "for any statement he makes or endorses which is prejudicial or
detrimental to the best interests of basketball and to suspend or fine
the player for conduct that is detrimental to the NBA."'11 The NBA
Constitution also grants the commissioner the exceptionally broad
power to punish players who are "guilty of conduct that does not con-
form to standards of morality and fair play."T2
The commissioners of each league are charged with using their pro-
fessional judgment to determine what is in the best interest of the
league, with few explicit guidelines for each commissioner to follow.' 3
The commissioners' best interest authority requires no specific act in
violation of a league rule and is broad enough to supersede player
6. The MLB Constitution authorizes the commissioner to take disciplinary action against con-
duct deemed "not to be in the best interests of Baseball." Major League Baseball, Major
League Constitution art. II, § 3 (2006), available at http://www.bizofbaseball.com/docs/MLConsi-
titutionJune2005Update.pdf. The NFL Constitution looks at conduct "detrimental to the
League or professional football." Nat'I Football League, Constitution and Bylaws of the NFL
art. 8.13(A) (rev. 1999); see also Showalter, supra note 4, at 207. The NHL bylaws give the
commissioner authority over conduct "whether during or outside the playing season [that] has
been dishonorable, prejudicial to or against the welfare of the League or the game of hockey."
Nat'l Hockey League, NHL Bylaws § 17.3(a) (1990); see also Showalter, supra note 4, at 207.
The NBA Constitution covers both conduct at or during a game that is "prejudicial to or against
the best interests of the Association or the game of basketball" and "conduct prejudicial. . or
detrimental to the" NBA. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, NBA Constitution art. XXXV(d)-(e) (1989)
[hereinafter NBA Constitution]; see also Showalter, supra note 4, at 207.
7. Christopher J. McKinny, Professional Sports Leagues and the First Amendment: A Closed
Marketplace, 13 MARo. SPORTs L. Ruv. 223, 235-236 (2003).
8. Jason M. Pollack, Take My Arbitrator, Please: Commissioner "Best Interests" Disciplinary
Authority in Professional Sports, 67 FORDIAM L. Rev. 1645, 1648 (1999).
9. McKinny, supra note 7, at 235-236.
10. Id.
11. Robert 1. Lockwood, The Best Interests of the League: Referee Betting Scandal Brings
Commissioner Authority and Collective Bargaining Back to the Frontcourt in the NBA, 15 SPowrs
LAw. J. 137, 151 (2008).
12. NBA Constitution, supra note 6, at art. XXXV(d).
13. Id. at 147.
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autonomy, "including any sanction that might be directed at individ-
ual players for words, conduct, or association with suspect parties." 1 4
This expansive amount of control over the lives of professional ath-
letes is not, however, unlimited.
2. Collective Bargaining Agreement
Perhaps nothing limits the powers of the commissioner more than
the Collective Bargaining Agreements that exist between the players'
unions and their respective leagues. Negotiating with the league to
produce a Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") offers profes-
sional athletes an opportunity to impose checks on commissioner
power, such as rule change restrictions and arbitration processes,
while also reserving certain powers for the commissioner. Because
the players' unions negotiate on behalf of the athletes, the relative
strength of a league's players' union often determines the extent of
the limits on commissioner authority under the CBA.
Due to the strength of the MLB Players' Association ("MLBPA"),
the CBA between the MLB and the union imposes significant limita-
tions on the MLB commissioner. The MLB and MLBPA's CBA cov-
ers all rule changes, requiring the league to give notice of any
proposed changes to the MLBPA and to negotiate the change with the
union if the rule change alters a player benefit under existing rules or
imposes a new obligation upon players.15 In addition, the MLB and
MLBPA's CBA offers players the opportunity to appeal a disciplinary
decision for conduct outside the playing field to an impartial grievance
arbitration panel, which will decide whether the commissioner had
just cause to impose the punishment. 16
The NHL commissioner's powers are similarly limited by the CBA
between the NHL and the NHL Players' Association ("NHLPA").
The NHL cannot alter any league or playing rules affecting the terms
or conditions of employment without written approval from the
NHLPA and cannot enforce any rules which have not been furnished
to the union.17 In the case of "any dispute involving the interpretation
or application of, or compliance with, any provision of" the CBA, the
league or the union may file a grievance.' 8 This language extends the
14. Id.
15. Major League Baseball, 2007-2011 Basic Agreement, art. XVIII (2007), available at http://
mlbplayers.mlb.comlpalpdf/cbaenglish.pdf.
16. Id. at art. XI.
17. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between NHL and NHLPA, July 22, 2005 - September
15, 2011, art. XXX § 3 (2005), available at http://www.nhl.com/cba/2005-CBA.pdf.
18. Id. at art. XVII.
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arbitrator's jurisdiction further than the MLB's arbitration process,
which reserves exclusive jurisdiction to the commissioner for conduct
occurring on the playing field. The NHL and the NHLPA must first
meet to discuss the matter, with the goal of reaching a settlement. 19 If
they cannot resolve the issue, then the two parties must arbitrate the
issue before an impartial grievance arbitrator.20
The CBA between the NFL and the NFL Players' Association
("NFLPA") covers only playing rules. It requires the league to give
notice of proposed rule changes to the NFLPA. 21 The NFLPA may
call a meeting with the league to discuss any rule change it believes
may affect player safety.2 2 If no agreement is reached, the NFLPA
can request a non-binding advisory decision from an arbitrator.23 Un-
like the other leagues' use of impartial arbitrators, players can only
appeal disciplinary decisions to the league commissioner. 24
The CBA between the NBA and the National Basketball Players'
Association ("NBPA") arguably cedes to the commissioner the most
rule-making authority of the four major sports leagues,25 specifically
authorizing the commissioner to "promulgate and enforce reasonable
rules governing the conduct of players on the playing court" or "con-
duct that is harmful to the 'preservation of the integrity of, or the
maintenance of public confidence in, the game." 26 As opposed to a
plain reading of "on the playing court," the NBA and NBPA's CBA
defines the phrase broadly, as "conduct in any area within an arena." 27
The CBA imposes no notice, negotiation, or consent requirements on
the NBA in regards to rule changes.
19. Id.
20. Id.





24. Id. at art. XI.
25. Showalter, supra note 4, at 215.
26. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. VI § 12 (2005), [here-
inafter NBA CBA] available at http://www.nbpa.com/cba-articles.php; Adam B. Marks, Person-
nel Foul on the National Football League Players Association: How Union Executive Director
Gene Upshaw Failed the Union's Members By Not Fighting the Enactment of the Personal Con-
duct Policy, 40 CONN. L. Ri.v. 1581, 1617 (2008).
27. NBA CBA, supra note 26, at art. XXXI, § 8(c). ("As used in this Agreement, 'conduct on
the playing court' shall mean conduct in any area within an arena (including, but not limited to,
locker rooms, vomitories, loading docks, and other back-of-house and underground areas, in-
cluding those used by television production and other vehicles) at, during or in connection with
an NBA Exhibition, All-Star, Regular Season or Playoff game.")
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Still, the collective bargaining process can serve "as a vehicle for
reigning in the traditional, nearly unlimited, authority of the commis-
sioner in basketball to act unilaterally in the best interest of the
league." 28 As one example, the CBA negotiations between the NBA
and NBPA in 1995 served to reign in the NBA commissioner's author-
ity by implementing an internal grievance process similar to the
MLB's. 29 Since that agreement, NBA players have been able to ap-
peal disciplinary decisions by the commissioner to a neutral third-
party arbitrator.30 This right to appeal is ostensibly limited to disci-
pline for conduct off the court, because the commissioner has the au-
thority to hear all appeals related to activity on the playing court.31
The NBA and NBPA's CBA differentiates on the court conduct,
where the commissioner has broad, exclusive disciplinary authority,
from off the court conduct, where outside review is allowed.32
The Jermaine O'Neal case helped define the current contours of the
arbitration process. During a fight between players and spectators
that occurred at the end of a game at the Palace of Auburn Hills be-
tween the Detroit Pistons and the visiting Indiana Pacers in 2004, Pac-
ers player Jermaine O'Neal punched a spectator who had run onto the
court.33 The league subsequently suspended him for twenty-five
games, and the NBPA appealed the suspension to a grievance arbitra-
tor.34 That arbitrator interpreted "on the playing court" more nar-
rowly than the definition argued for by the league, defining O'Neal's
conduct as off the court and therefore within the arbitrator's jurisdic-
tion.35 The arbitrator went on to interpret the standard of review to
be whether the commissioner's imposed discipline is fair and reasona-
ble3 6 and determined that the arbitrator's authority included "altering
the sanctions that the commissioner had originally imposed." 37 The
arbitrator ultimately reduced O'Neal's suspension to fifteen games.
The NBA responded by challenging the arbitrability of Stern's deci-
sion in district court, arguing that O'Neal's conduct took place on the
playing court and therefore fell within the commissioner's exclusive
jurisdiction.38 After analyzing previous player conduct memos that
28. Lockwood, supra note 11, at 158.
29. Id. at 154.
30. See NBA CBA, supra note 26, at art. XXXI.
31. Marks, supra note 26, at 1616.
32. Lockwood, supra note 11, at 157.
33. NBA v. Nat'l Basketball Players Ass'n, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26244 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
34. Id.
35. Lockwood, supra note 11, at 157.
36. Id. at 155.
37. Id. at 158.
38. NBA v. Nat'l Basketball Players Ass'n, supra note 33.
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"sought to differentiate between 'on the court' and 'off the court' con-
duct," the district court determined that the conduct was so external
to the game that it could not possibly have been contemplated as con-
stituting conduct "on the playing court." 39 The court specifically ar-
gued that fighting with a spectator, while inexcusable, "has never been
characterized as conduct on the playing court." 40 As a result, the dis-
trict court confirmed the arbitrator's decision to reduce the length of
O'Neal's suspension.
B. Externally Defined Contours of Commissioner Authority
The sports leagues in the U.S. are still subject to substantive exter-
nal law, including labor law and private association law. In addition, if
one can successfully prove that a league constitutes a state actor, it
may be subject to the First Amendment protections of free speech and
expression.
1. Labor Law
Labor law, embodied by the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA"), 41 helps to support Collective Bargaining Agreements,
making them the "supreme governing authority" over all terms and
conditions of employment.42 The mandatory terms include "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 43 The NLRA
precludes an employer from changing these terms and conditions
without engaging in collective bargaining with the union.44 In the con-
text of the four major sports leagues, this "has served to dramatically
limit the authority of the commissioners," because the commissioners
serve as the employers of the professional athletes and as the party
with which the unions negotiate. 45
Mandating certain items be subject to collective bargaining provides
an important limit on the powers of a commissioner to implement
rules that may be to the detriment of the athletes. When the commis-
sioner is required to negotiate on mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining, "past union efforts to secure increased rights for members
have proved quite successful." 46
39. Marks, supra note 26, at 1617.
40. NBA v. Nat'1 Basketball Players Ass'n, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26244 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); See
also Lockwood, supra note 11, at 157.
41. Nat'l Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994) [hereinafter NLRA].
42. Jan Stiglitz, Player Discipline in Team Sports, 5 MARo. SPORTs L.J. 167, 173 (1995).
43. NLRA, supra note 41.
44. Stiglitz, supra note 42, at 173.
45. Id.
46. McKinny, supra note 7, at 253.
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2. Private Association Law
As a general principle, courts will decline to interfere in the internal
disputes involving members of a private association. 4 7 This principle
has been referred to by some scholars as "private association law." 4 8
Because all four major sports leagues purport to be private enter-
prises, private association law applies and courts generally will not
hear disputes over league rulings. However, this is not an absolute
bar to court intervention in disputes over commissioner decisions.
While the courts will not examine the appropriateness of a given
disciplinary action or whether a commissioner's decision is actually in
the best interests of the sport, there are three instances where the
courts may elect to intervene in the internal actions of a private asso-
ciation. 4 9 First, courts may determine whether the commissioner ac-
ted in good faith in handing down any disciplinary action.50 Second,
the courts can decide whether a punishment is in excess of the author-
ity held by the commissioner. Indeed, the courts have determined
that commissioners' decisions to strip teams of draft picks and to uni-
laterally realign divisions in the league were beyond the authority
granted to them by the league constitutions.51 Finally, the courts may
also scrutinize commissioner action for procedural correctness, ensur-
ing that "certain principles of procedural fairness" are present.5 2
3. First Amendment
While the contours of commissioner authority have been estab-
lished through years of interaction among commissioners, players' un-
ions, and the courts, the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
has received little attention as a method to challenge the actions of a
47. Stiglitz, supra note 42, at 174.
48. "A most dramatic illustration of this principal occurred in Carr v. St.John's University, 17
A.D.2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1962), where the court refused to interfere with a university's
decision to expel Catholic students who had participated in a civil marriage ceremony." Id. at
174 n.38. See generally Jeffrey A. Durney, Fair or Foul? The Commissioner and Major League
Baseball's Disciplinary Process, 41 EMORY L.J. 581 (1992); McKinny, supra note 7, at 236-237.
49. See generally id.
50. Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 539 (7th Cir. 1978) (deciding that the MLB
commissioner had acted in good faith, and looking no further into the appropriateness of the
given punishment).
51. Showalter, supra note 4, at 208; Stiglitz, supra note 42, at 175; Atlanta Nat'l League Base-
ball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1223 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (deciding that denying a team a
draft choice was outside the scope of the MLB commissioner's disciplinary authority); Chicago
Nat'l League Ball Club Inc. v. Francis Vincent, Jr., No. 92 C 4398 (U.S.D.C., N.D.ll. 1992)
(unreported) (ruling that the MLB commissioner could not unilaterally realign league divisions);
Riko Enterprises v. Seattle Supersonics, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (ruling that the
NBA commissioner could not strip a team of its draft pick).
52. Stiglitz, supra note 42, at 176.
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commissioner. Part of the reason for this limited attention is the re-
quirement that an entity must be a state actor in order to be restrained
by the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech and expression.
However, private enterprises may qualify as state actors "when the
actions of the private entity are 'so entwined' with the state that the
state can be held responsible for the actions of the private entity."53
All four major sports leagues are established as private enterprises,
not owned or operated by the state. If the state and a sports league
are sufficiently interconnected, the players' union may be able to hold
that league subject to the First Amendment and require that the play-
ers' rights to free speech and expression remain in tact. The relevant
test to determine whether the sports leagues may be considered state
actors is the symbiotic relationship test.5 4 This test analyzes "whether
there is 'a symbiotic relationship involving the sharing of profits' be-
tween the subject entity and the state"55 to the extent that "the State
has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the
private actor] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the
challenged activity." 56 The significant connections between the four
major sports leagues and state and local governments open the possi-
bility of satisfying the symbiotic relationship test. David Stern has
even said that "ideal partnership is a private/public corporate partner-
ship" between the teams and the local communities.57
Given the fact that the vast majority of sports arenas are subsidized
by state and local governments, characterizing a sports league as a
state actor is not without precedent.58 The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York decided in Ludtke v. Kuhn that the
MLB commissioner was a state actor.59 In the case, the commissioner
banned female reporters from team locker rooms, and a female re-
porter sued after she was prohibited from the New York Yankees
locker room. 6 0 The court analyzed the team's entanglement with the
city, focusing on the fact that New York City purchased Yankee Sta-
dium using "its power of eminent domain upon a factual show-
ing. . .that [the] purchase of Yankee Stadium was required for a
53. Dean, supra note 1, at 158.
54. Id. at 160.
55. Id. at 162.
56. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)
57. Sean Gregory, 10 Questions for David Stern, p. 2, Timi, Mar. 12, 2008, available at http://
www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1721861-2,00.html.
58. Dean, supra note 1, at 163-165.
59. Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F. Supp. 86, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
60. Id. at 88.
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'public use."61 The City then leased it to the Yankees, rather than the
highest bidder, after a statutory declaration by the state legislature
that the team was of "cultural, recreational and economic" impor-
tance to the city and state.62 These facts led to the determination that
the team, and by extension the MLB commissioner, was a state actor,
and therefore could not discriminate against female reporters in this
manner. Similarly, in Hertel v. City of Pontiac, a U.S. District Court in
Michigan found that the NFL's blackout rule constituted state action
in regards to the Detroit Lions, who subleased the Silverdome from
the City of Pontiac.63 The City possessed a financial interest in the
stadium, receiving revenue from concessions and parking, and re-
tained responsibilities for "maintenance, repair, and police supervi-
sion."64 This was sufficient for the court to find that the league's rule
constituted state action. Neither of these determinations have been
explicitly affirmed or rejected by any higher courts, but both remain
influential in their application to the many sports teams who lease
their stadiums from a state or local government.
If the NBA, or any other league, is successfully shown to be a state
actor, then most speech must be protected in public forums. David
Stern has punished players and coaches for making derogatory com-
ments about religious groups and racial minorities and for making re-
marks critical of referees while in NBA arenas. 65 However, "NBA
arenas are most accurately characterized as public forums open for
communication in which valid restrictions on speech are significantly
limited," and if the First Amendment applies to the NBA, then the
league could no longer punish players or coaches for engaging in pro-
tected speech.66 As long as the speech does not fall into an unpro-
tected category, such as "fighting words, libel, advocacy that is
directed to or likely to produce imminent unlawful activity, or obscen-
ity," 6 7 then coaches and players would have greater freedom to speak.
III. DAVID STERN'S COMMISSIONERSHIP
Over the past several years, David Stern has implemented numer-
ous rules without input from the NBPA. Stern has installed many of
61. Id. at 92.
62. Id.; see also Dean, supra note 1, at 163.
63. Hertel v. City of Pontiac, 470 F. Supp. 603, 605 (E.D. Mich. 1979). The blackout rule
"prohibits television broadcasts of 'home' football games in areas within 75 miles of the 'home'
stadium." Id. at 604.
64. Id. at 604-605.
65. Dean, supra note 1, at 157.
66. Id. at 159.
67. Id. at 168.
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these rules with the desire to improve the league's image. This push
was spurred by perceived image problems facing the league,68 espe-
cially since the 2004 fight between players and fans at the Palace of
Auburn Hills.69 Few dispute Stern's authority to govern what occurs
on the court during NBA games, but many are concerned about what
they perceive to be Stern pushing the limits of his authority over con-
duct occurring outside of the game.
Many of Stern's recent rule implementations have not focused on
safety or the integrity of the game, but "instead, there has even been a
shift from simply disciplining on-court actions to one where there is a
need to control off-court behavior that might damage the public im-
age of the league."70 As commissioner, Stern is responsible for up-
holding and promoting the financial viability of the league,71 and for
this reason, he "has increasingly become focused on making sure that
those who play in the NBA comport to an image that is acceptable to
the audience who pays to watch this form of entertainment, as well as
to a group of vocal owners who view socially objectionable behavior
as damaging to their financial bottom line." 72 Stern has pursued this
goal by implementing such rules as a dress code, various uniform
rules, immediate technical fouls for excessive complaining, a possible
ban on certain nightclubs, and stricter punishments for criticizing
referees in any context.
Perhaps the most controversial of the new rules has been the dress
code, implemented at the beginning of the 2005-2006 season to
"soften the NBA's hip-hop image and increase the league's appeal to
its fans."73 The dress code requires all players to "wear Business Cas-
ual attire whenever they are engaged in team or league business," in-
cluding while they are traveling to and from the respective NBA
arena.74 In addition, players attending games and sitting on the bench
or in the stands when injured or otherwise unable to play must wear a
68. Rich Kurtzman, David "Too" Stern Correctly Cracks Down on Complaining in NBA,
bleacher report, Oct. 15, 2010, available at http://bleacherreport.com/articles/492552-david-ld-
quotoordquo-stern-correctly-cracks-down-on-complaining-in-nba.
69. See supra, Part II.A.2.
70. Lockwood, supra note 11, at 160.
71. Showalter, supra note 4, at 209 (pointing out Stern's role in leading the NBA to its period
of greatest growth).
72. Lockwood, supra note 11, at 160.
73. Showalter, supra note 4, at 210.
74. NBA Player Dress Code, NBA.com, Jan. 20, 2006, http://www.nba.com/news/
player dress code_051017.html. Business casual is defined as: "A long or short-sleeved dress
shirt (collared or turtleneck), and/or a sweater. Dress slacks, khaki pants, or dress jeans. Appro-
priate shoes and socks, including dress shoes, dress boots, or other presentable shoes, but not
including sneakers, sandals, flip-flops, or work boots." Id.
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sport coat.75 The dress code also bans certain articles of clothing, in-
cluding hats, chains, and sunglasses while indoors.76
The dress code was implemented by Stern unilaterally, using his
"best interests" authority. However, as discussed in Part II of this pa-
per, that authority is limited. A dress code affects a player's terms and
conditions of employment, meaning that any change must be bar-
gained for in the NBA and NBPA's CBA under the NLRA.77 While
the league discussed the dress code with the NBPA, it engaged in no
formal bargaining.78 Because the dress code was not bargained for by
the league, if the NBPA were to object, there is a very strong possibil-
ity that the code would have to be modified or eliminated.79 How-
ever, because the union has not formally objected since the dress code
was implemented, that seems unlikely.
In addition to concerns over whether Stern properly bargained for a
dress code, many have criticized it as overly paternalistic and "some
NBA players have characterized this management-driven dress code
as racist and emblematic of the commissioner's desire to use his best
interest authority to limit player autonomy."80 Many also oppose the
dress code as unnecessary and unrelated to the job, a point empha-
sized by "the fact that reasonable alternatives to the NBA Dress Code
exist - moderation in jewelry as opposed to its complete
prohibition." 8
In a 2006 interview, Washington Wizards player Antonio Daniels
made the observation that he "always thought the dress code would
75. Id.
76. Id. The full list of banned articles of clothing includes: "Sleeveless shirts, Shorts, T-shirts,
jerseys, or sports apparel (unless appropriate for the event (e.g., a basketball clinic), team-identi-
fied, and approved by the team), Headgear of any kind while a player is sitting on the bench or
in the stands at a game, during media interviews, or during a team or league event or appearance
(unless appropriate for the event or appearance, team-identified, and approved by the team),
Chains, pendants, or medallions worn over the player's clothes, Sunglasses while indoors, Head-
phones (other than on the team bus or plane, or in the team locker room)." Id.
77. Showalter, supra note 4, at 221.
78. Posting of Michael McCann to Sports Law Blog, available at http://sports-law.blogspot.
com/search?q=%22nba+dress+code%22 (Oct. 25, 2005, 17:42 EST).
79. The head of the NBPA, Antonio Davis "has not consented to exactly what the NBA uni-
laterally implemented (because Davis said he is only "willing to go so far"). Thus, presumably
the association has not entirely consented, and the association could bring an unfair labor charge
against the league claiming that a dress code is a mandatory subject and, therefore, must be
negotiated with the association and the league can't unilaterally implement it. On the other
hand, if the union did in fact consent to the dress code, then this dissident group of players could
bring an unfair labor charge against the union claiming that the association members were de-
nied access to information and the right to vote." Id.
80. Lockwood, supra note 11, at 159.
81. Mark R. Bandsuch, The NBA Dress Code and Other Fashion Faux Pas Under Title VII, 16
Vu-i. SPoRrs & ENTr. L.J. 1, 44-45 (2009).
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expand to other things and it has." 82 The next unilateral change im-
plemented by the league was the introduction of a new type of basket-
ball. The ball was universally panned, and "because neither the
NBPA nor the players were consulted before introduction of the ball,
the NBPA filed an unfair labor practice charge claiming that the ball
adversely affected working conditions and, therefore, could not be
unilaterally implemented by Stern."83 The case was ultimately ren-
dered moot when Stern eliminated the new ball from NBA play.8
Stern also pursued an effort to ban NBA players from certain night-
clubs, requiring "its security forces to promulgate a list of nightclubs
in all NBA cities that players should not visit. Once such locations are
identified, 'the league will send a directive to teams mandating that
players avoid those spots or be subject to a substantial fine." 85 Such
a ban would also be a mandatory subject for collective bargaining
under the NLRA, and therefore Stern likely would not be able to
withstand a challenge to it by the players' union. 6
During his tenure, Stern has imposed numerous uniform rules, gov-
erning what the players can wear on the court. He began by restrict-
ing the length of the shorts the players can wear. As of the 2006-2007
season, NBA players "can wear one 4-inch wristband on each wrist[,
which] cannot be worn on the bicep. . .headbands can be no wider
than 2 inches, [and players] can no longer [wear] tights or long com-
pression socks."87 The ban on wearing tights was implemented in re-
sponse to some players who were wearing them for the look, and the
reasoning behind the ban was that "the league simply does not like
the look of players wearing visible hose." 88 Players are now required
to send the league a doctor's note testifying to a medical need for the
tights in order to wear them.8 9 "Other uniform rules that are more
strictly enforced and subject players to discipline for the season are
82. Michael Wilbon, NBA Players Need to Play by the Rule, WASHINGTON PosTr E01, Nov. 11,
2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/10/
AR2006111001938_pf.html. "Daniels is 31 years old and a player who never needed a dress code
because he comes well dressed to every single game, period. He does not need a behavior code
because he's never flailing and gesticulating. Yet he said before last night's game: 'I hate the
crackdown. Hate it."' Id.
83. Showalter, supra note 4, at 211.
84. Id.
85. Id. As the nightclub ban was only promulgated via internal directive, it is unclear as to
whether it ever went into effect. There are no available stories featuring player complaints
about the ban going into effect.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Darren Rovell and Marc Stein, League would amend uniform code to ban tights,
ESPN.com, Mar. 31, 2006, available at http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=2390599.
89. Id.
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that 'players must keep their uniform shirts tucked into their pants'
while they are on the court and are prohibited from wearing rubber
bands."90 Antonio Daniels lamented the wristband restriction, stat-
ing, "I liked wearing a wristband with my daughter's name on it. But
the rule says that now I cannot do that. I can only wear a wristband
with my name or number."91
In early 2009, the NBA officially outlawed the "Wade Aid," a band-
aid worn by Miami Heat player Dwyane Wade beneath his left eye
first to cover a cut but later solely for the style. 92 The "Wade Aids"
included "his name, nickname 'Flash' and even the American flag on
the Band-Aid." 93 The NBA explained the ban as a desire to halt the
self-promotion, limiting band-aids to "healthcare purposes, but it
shouldn't have any name or identifications on it."94 In October 2010,
the NBA issued another uniform rule, micromanaging player attire
even further. The NBA barred players from wearing headbands up-
side-down, even though it is unlikely that many viewers of NBA
games ever noticed that any player was wearing his headband upside-
down.95
The 2006-2007 season also saw renewed emphasis on conduct dur-
ing the National Anthem, requiring "players, coaches and train-
ers. . .to stand and line up in a dignified posture along the sidelines or
on the foul line." 9 6 Players were also no longer allowed to chew gum
or shift as they stood in line during the National Anthem.97
Stern also sought to improve the image of the league by reducing
tolerance for complaining about a referee's call, authoring officials "to
call a technical foul for behavior that reflected poorly on the overall
league image." 98 Supporters of the rule justify it by arguing that ex-
cessive complaining disrupts the game, opens referees to direct abuse,
and creates the potential for violent conduct.99 However, Stern's most
recent declarations have targeted not just excessive complaining but
90. Showalter, supra note 4, at 211.
91. Wilbon, supra note 82.




95. Kelly Dwyer, The NBA has banned upside-down headbands, Yahoo! Sports, Oct. 27, 2010,
http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/blog/ball-dont_1ie/post/The-NBA-has-banned-upside-downhead-
bands; ylt=AvB4rQE iP2y6RPKaQPQJk5nYcB?urn=$nba-280453.
96. Showalter, supra note 4, at 211.
97. Id.
98. Bandsuch, supra note 81, at 44.
99. Kurtzman, supra note 68, available at http://bleacherreport.com/articles/492552-david-d-
quotoordquo-stern-correctly-cracks-down-on-complaining-in-nba.
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any responses to the NBA's referees at all. Guidelines issued by Stern
and the NBA for the 2010-11 season now require referees to call tech-
nical fouls on players for any "body language to question or demon-
strate displeasure."100 The guidelines specifically require technical
foul calls for aggressive gestures, running up to a referee to complain,
and "excessive inquiries about a call, even in a civilized tone."101 The
new guidelines threaten to drive emotions out of the game of basket-
ball, even those emotions generally seen as positive such as camarade-
rie, as Grant Hill, widely seen as one of the nicest players in the
league, was ejected in a pre-season game for "exchanging butt pats
with Reggie Evans after Hill tripped in the game."10 2 While the argu-
ments are favor of reducing complaining are credible, logical, and jus-
tifiable, Stern's new rules appear to overreach, barring natural
reactions that occur in the heat of the contest.
Alterations to the uniform rules and the technical foul policy are
much more likely to fall under the scope of Stern's authority. In addi-
tion, the uniform rules likely do not affect the conditions of a player's
employment, and therefore would not receive the same scrutiny under
the NLRA.10 3 However, that does not necessarily make his decisions
appropriate, and if players are legitimately concerned about Stern's
use of power, then the NBPA should engage in negotiations to limit
this kind of unilateral rule-making.
Comments about referee performance made outside of the game do
not carry the same concerns as berating officials during the game, and
yet, the league regularly fines players, coaches, and team officials for
criticizing officials after games. While Stern's expansive powers allow
him to discipline individuals for conduct that occurs within the NBA
arena, thereby covering comments made during post-game press con-
ferences, he has not limited his discipline to speech in NBA arenas.
He has fined players, coaches, and team officials for any speech, in-
cluding criticism that appears on blogs.10 4 The criticism can be im-
plicit or constructive,' 05 and the league will still fine individuals. In
fact, in March 2009, the NBA took the unprecedented step of fining
100. Henry Abbott, NBA expands rules on technicals, ESPN.com, Sept. 24, 2010, available at
http://sports.espn.go.com/nbalnews/storyid=5609817.
101. Id.
102. Kurtzman, supra note 98.
103. Showalter, supra note 4, at 221.
104. David DuPree, NBA Fines Cuban $250,000 for Behavior after Game 5, USA ToDAY, Jun.
21, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com./sports/basketball/playoffs/2006-06-20-cuban-
fine x.htm. Mark Cuban has been fined over $1.5 million by the NBA for criticism of referees
over the years. Id.
105. Id. (citing Cuban's blog about how to improve officiating).
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Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban $25,000 for a single comment he
posted on his Twitter page, reading "how do they not call a tech on JR
Smith for coming off the bench to taunt our player on the ground?" 06
Fining someone for a single line on a social networking site is well
beyond the scope of the NBA commissioner's enumerated authority.
Moreover, in implementing such rules, Stern has displayed an in-
creasingly authoritarian tone. During the 2010 NBA Playoffs, Stern
made public statements demanding that coaches and players halt any
criticism, overt or subtle, of NBA referees, declaring that "if someone
wants to try me in the rest of this playoffs, you know, make my
day." 1 0 7 He accompanied this threat by claiming that fines of $35,000
were modest and that he planned to drastically increase fines for criti-
cizing referees in the future. 0 8 Stern's conduct begs the question:
how far is too far?
IV. CONCLUSION
While David Stern, as NBA commissioner, has expansive authority
to discipline the conduct of players, coaches, and team officials, he has
pushed the limits of this authority by implementing rules unilaterally,
without input from the players' union. In addition, he has imposed
several rules with little basis behind them, citing only a personal dis-
like for the aesthetics of the banned items. These are troubling signs
of Stern's willingness to govern at his whim as opposed to acting solely
in the best interests of the league and of a larger trend toward the
league minimizing the opinion of the players.
Some of the rules Stern has imposed clearly fall within the powers
of the NBA commissioner, while others arguably should have been
bargained for with the union prior to implementation. Despite the
opposition to some of these rules by many NBA players, the NBPA
has not formally opposed any of the changes, except for the change to
a new type of basketball. In that instance, once the NBPA publicly
opposed the change, the NBA quickly eliminated the ball, showing
that the NBPA is able to stand up to the league on behalf of the play-
ers and effectuate meaningful change.
106. NBA Fines Mark Cuban $25,000 for Twitter Comment, TiE EXAMINER, Mar. 30, 2009,
available at http://www.examiner.com/x-1192-NBA-Examiner-y2009m3d30-NBA-fines-Mark-
Cuban-25000-for-Twitter-comment.
107. Trey Kirby, David Stern has had enough of your whining, NBA coaches, Yahoo! Sports,




The current CBA between the NBA and NBPA expires in 2011,
with an option for the league to extend the agreement by one year. 09
At that time, the NBPA will have the opportunity to halt the trend of
unilateral implementation of rules by the commissioner. While the
union will be unlikely to challenge any of the recently implemented
image rules, it should act to protect itself in the future. Specifically,
the NBPA should follow the MLBPA and NHLPA's lead by negotiat-
ing with the league to require that the commissioner give notice to the
player's association prior to the implementation of new rules. The
NBPA should also argue for a process similar to the MLB, which re-
quires a negotiation period in which the NBPA can have input on new
rules before the commissioner imposes them. Including a notice and
negotiation requirement in the CBA between the NBA and NBPA
will improve the public perception of the rules, because the players,
through their union representatives, will have approved of those rules
in advance.
Protection of players' First Amendment rights is another point that
the NBPA could negotiate into the CBA. In response to the league's
frequent restrictions on speech, "it would seem perfectly reasonable
to amend league constitutions and CBAs to contain 'First Amend-
ment-like' rights. For example, league constitutions could contain
provisions requiring commissioners to consider First Amendment ju-
risprudence when dealing with free speech and religious expression-
related issues."110 In addition, the union could negotiate to limit the
NBA's reach into players' lives by exempting speech in certain loca-
tions, such as on social networking websites or in personal blogs. Such
a clause could be constructive for both sides. As noted earlier, the
NBA may constitute a state actor and therefore be required to offer
full First Amendment protection to players. By contracting with the
union, the league could escape potential liability for restricting speech
and could preserve some limits on speech. On the other side, with
such a provision, players would receive at least some speech protec-
tion as opposed to receiving the significant fines that are currently
imposed for speaking about a variety of subjects.
If the NBPA hopes to impose any limits on commissioner authority,
it must take a harder stance than it has in recent years, when it has
offered little opposition to the league's new rules. What the union is
able to get in the next CBA negotiations depends in part on the
NBA's agenda. David Stern has already been public about his inten-
109. NBA CBA, supra note 26, at art. XXXIX, §§ 1-2.
110. McKinny, supra note 7, at 254.
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tion to raise the NBA's age limit to twenty, as well as altering various
components of the salary cap."1' The NBPA must assure that it gains
as much as it concedes. The difficult economic situations facing the
league and teams are going to prohibit the players from getting a sig-
nificantly larger portion of the league's profits.112 Instead of focusing
the negotiations solely on increasing the amount of money the players
get, the NBPA should instead push for greater limitations on the com-
missioner's right to impose rules and levy fines against players.
Each new rule that the NBA imposes without engaging in formal
bargaining with the players' union is accompanied by vocal opposition
from individual players. The NBA and the NBPA can avoid these
complaints by incorporating notice and negotiation requirements on
rule changes and speech protections into the CBA. These changes can
halt the troubling trend toward David Stern acquiring unlimited, unre-
strained authority.
111. Sean Gregory, 10 Questions for David Stern, p. 1, Tim, Mar. 12, 2008, available at http://
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sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=simmons/090227 (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
